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WAS TV ELECTION NEWS BETTER THIS TIME? 
A Content Analysis of 1988 and 1992 Campaign Coverage 
Richard E. Noyes, S. Robert Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson 
Center for Media and Public Affairs 
Washington, D.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
More than any recent presidential campaign, the 1988 campaign 
was criticized for shallowness and negativity, on the part of both 
the candidates and the news media. According to surveys, 
considerable numbers of voters were displeased with the cam-
paign coverage. An October, 1988 poll showed nearly four voters 
in ten rated the press' s campaign perf onnance as only fair or poor. 
(Times Mirror, 1988) A majority of voters (57%) believed that 
news organizations tended to favor one side when reporting 
political issues, and half believed that news reports "are often 
inaccurate." (Times Mirror, 1989). 
It was not just the public that was displeased. Various 
critics-among them academics, journalists, and even a few 
campaign handlers-cited a now-familiar litany: shrinking sound 
bites, a preoccupation with polls, intrusions into candidates' 
private lives, and a dearth of substantive policy coverage. The 
voters' ability to make an informed choice was the main casualty 
of this type of coverage. 
According to these critics, candidate rhetoric focused on 
the trivial and the negative. Instead of challenging this trend, 
television news magnified it. Some candidates in 1988, notably 
then-Vice President George Bush, ran negative campaigns, but 
were not called to account by the news media. Television adopted 
an insider's perspective that relished describing and assessing the 
tactics of modern campaigns, while ignoring normative concerns 
about those tactics. Writing after the election, Marvin Kalb, a 
former network correspondent who now directs Harvard's media 
studies program, called the coverage "shallow and distinctly 
timid." (Kalb, 1988) He faulted television for not challenging the 
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candidates, particularly Bush. 
Kalb and others argued that, with the decline of other 
political institutions, television had "acquired new responsibili-
ties it did not seek and is poorly equipped to handle." (Kalb, 1988; 
also Germond and Witcover, 1989; Broder, 1990) According to 
this view, the atrophy of party organizations has left the media, 
particularly network television, responsible for instructing voters 
about the major issues, screening candidates for their qualifica-
tions, and disciplining those candidates whose tactics crossed the 
threshold of fairness. In 1988, these critics charged, television 
failed to meet its new obligations. 
This indictment of 1988 became the intellectual founda-
tion for efforts to reform coverage in advance of the 1992 election. 
Myriad articles, speeches, books and symposia were dedicated to 
this effort during the three years between the two campaigns. The 
result was an unusual consensus on some initial steps to improve 
political campaigns by changing television's approach to cover-
ing them. These included calls for more news coverage of 
substantive issues, increased vigilance against deceptive cam-
paign advertising, and increased assertiveness in setting the 
campaign agenda. (Broder, 1990; Russert, 1990) The Washing-
ton Post's influential reporter/columnist David Broder called on 
political reporters to "become partisan-not on behalf of a candi-
date or party-but on behalf of the process." (Broder, 1990). 
Our content analysis of 1992 network news campaign 
coverage provided an unusual opportunity to examine these 
attempts to change the focus of election news. The coding scheme 
was virtual! y identical to that used in our previous analysis of 19 8 8 
election coverage. (Lichter, etal., 1988; Lichter, et. al, 1989) This 
permits a direct comparison of television's campaign coverage in 
1988 and 1992, specifically in the areas of fairness and substance. 
Was the coverage better in 1992? And, at the end of the campaign, 
did it leave the public more satisfied than it was four years earlier? 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Content analysis research on television's campaign coverage has 
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concentrated on two areas. First, most studies seek to measure the 
relative amount and tone of coverage received by the various 
candidates. Second, many have measured the relative proportions 
of news going to matters of substance (i.e., policy issues) and 
hoopla (i.e., the campaign horse race). Early content studies 
concluded that, in its topical approach to campaign news, televi-
sion is preoccupied with news about the "horse race," and much 
less likely to broadcast stories about public policy concerns. 
(Patterson and McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980; Robinson and 
Sheehan, 1983) Critics have decried the superficiality of such a 
"horse racist" approach to coverage, which schools the electorate 
in the processes and stratagems of campaigns rather than inform-
ing them of the substantive consequences of their outcomes. Such 
coverage, it is argued, diminishes the value and meaning of the 
electoral process. 
Effects researchers have documented the consequences of 
this paucity of policy coverage on voter learning. In 1976, 
Thomas Patterson found that, while voters learned about policy 
issues from watching extended coverage of the party conventions 
and the presidential debates on television, there were no increases 
in knowledge associated with daily news coverage. (Patterson, 
1980) Analyzing the 1988 campaign, Drew and Weaver (1991) 
reported similar findings: voters learned a great deal from 
watching televised debates, but little from television's routine 
coverage. 
Beginning with the 1984 campaign, however, researchers 
began to document a shift away from intense coverage of the 
campaign horse race. Reviewing the Reagan-Mondale contest, 
Clancey and Robinson ( 1985) discovered that "horse race journal-
ism did not represent the most prevalent form of campaign 
reporting. Campaign issue pieces were emphasized instead." 
They defined campaign issues as non-policy concerns about how 
candidates and their campaigns should behave. Such campaign 
trail controversies frequently seem ephemeral or trivial. For 
example, in the 1984 general election, they found that nearly 40 
percent of campaign news focused on campaign issues such as 
Reagan's "inaccessibility" to reporters and Bush's post-debate 
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boast about "kicking ass." 
While campaign issues are arguably more relevant to 
voters than horse race news, they are seen by critics as no less a 
distraction from the real substance of a campaign. By focusing on 
campaign issues, the media shift the spotlight away from issues, 
parties and ideology, and instead highlight personalities and 
tactics. Coverage of campaign issues contributes nothing to voter 
knowledge of substantive policy issues. 
In addition to the agenda of campaign news, much content 
analysis has addressed the tone and balance of candidate cover-
age. Many studies have found that the media report favorably on 
certain candidates while treating others more skeptically. (Graber, 
1984; Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; Adams, 1984; Lichter, et. al., 
1988) Robinson and Sheehan (1983) have suggested that a 
"frontrunner bias" accounts for much of this variation. They 
argue that candidates who lead in public opinion polls are sub-
jected to more journalistic scrutiny than challengers or underdogs. 
Studies of both primary and general election contests have added 
considerable credence to this theory since 1980. 
In 1984 challenger Gary Hart received a large volume of 
good press after the Iowa caucuses and then beat frontrunner 
Walter Mondale in the New Hampshire primary. After New 
Hampshire, the new frontrunner was the subject of a series of 
negative television reports, and Hart subsequently lost to Mondale 
in several Super Tuesday contests . (Adams, 1984) Later in 1984, 
frontrunner Reagan received substantially more negative press 
during the general election than underdog Mondale. (Robinson, 
1985) Indeed, candidates and their campaign managers now 
attempt to influence news media perceptions of their viability. 
Campaigns routinely seek to pin the frontrunner label onto their 
rivals, at least until they have secured advantages that can with-
stand increased press scrutiny. 
Thus, the idea of an anti-frontrunner bias, and the notion 
that television news avoids covering substance, have both become 
commonplace among politicians and media researchers. How 
well did these patterns of coverage hold up in the more self-
conscious atmosphere of campaign journalism in 1992? 
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1988 vs. 1992: SUBSTANCE 
For both 1988 and 1992, we conducted a content analysis of all 
presidential campaign stories broadcast on the ABC, CBS, and 
NBC evening news programs between January 1 and election day. 
stories were selected for analysis if they included references to the 
presidential campaign, or if they discussed one or more of the 
candidates as presidential contenders. Thus, if the story discussed 
Bush solely in his capacity as president, without mentioning the 
campaign, it was not included in the sample. This procedure 
produced a sample of 2,281 stories in 1988 and 2,386 stories in 
1992. 
To assess the substance of campaign news, we examined 
each report to see how much discussion there was of the campaign 
horse race, policy issues, and campaign issues, respectively. We 
calculated the share of coverage each topic received, using the 
total number of stories in each time period as the base. Each of 
these topics was coded independently. Thus, a story could have 
been coded as containing discussion of all three topics, or none of 
the three. 
As Table 1 shows, campaign issues were more prominent 
in 1988 campaign coverage than were either policy issues or the 
horse race. Bush's choice of Dan Quayle as his running mate, and 
criticism over candidate tactics and the campaign process helped 
make campaign issues dominant during the conventions and 
general election phase. Horse race stories were dominant during 
the primary phase of the campaign, but were considerably less 
prominent during the fall. 
Policy issues, however, were not neglected in 1988. Al-
though the networks aired more stories about campaign issues and 
horse race over the course of the entire campaign, the share of 
news coverage devoted to policy matters increased significantly 
after the end of the primaries. From September through Novem-
ber, policy issues were extensively discussed in nearly 40 percent 
of network stories, double the rate of issue coverage during the 
primary phase. The networks aired more than 100 stories on the 
economy, national defense, and crime during the general election 
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Table 1 
ELECTION NEWS TOPICS OVER TIME 
1988 CAMPAIGN 
Gen. 
Primaries Conv's Election 
Polley Issues 19% 30% 39% 
Campaign Issues 21% 44% 43% 
Horse Race 51% 12% 25% 
TOTAL STORIES 890 699 589 
Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/88-6{7 /88; Conventions, 6/8/88-9/4/88; General Election, 
9/5/88-11{7/88 
TOTAL 
28% 
35% 
31% 
2,178 
Note - Totals do not equal 100% because more than one topic may have been coded per story, and table excludes 
less frequently covered topics such as past campaigns, nature of the electorate, etc. 
(N) 
610 
752 
684 
phase alone. After the primaries, policy issues consistently 
eceived a greater share of coverage than did the horse race. 
~ampaign issues overshadowed policy during the summer and 
fall, but they hardly drove them off the air. 
In many ways, coverage of the 1992 election began where 
the previous campaign had ended. As Table 2 shows, news 
coverage during the 1992 primaries contained more frequent 
discussions of both policy and campaign issues than had been the 
case in the 1988 primaries, and less time spent on the campaign 
horse race. The heaviest concentration of issue stories occurred 
during the weeks prior to the New Hampshire primary, when few 
campaign trail events demanded coverage and network control 
over the news agenda was greatest. The networks ran lengthy 
features detailing the candidates' positions on the economy, 
education, health care, and other important issues. The frequency 
of issue stories ebbed as the weekly circuit of primary contests 
began, but increased after the New York primary. Overall, policy 
stories were broadcast about as often as horse race stories during 
the 1992 primaries. In 1988, horse race stories outnumbered 
policy stories by nearly three to one during the same phase of the 
campaign. 
Campaign issues also received heavy coverage during the 
1992 primaries, mainly as the result of allegations about Bill 
Clinton's character. Through the New York primary, a total of 
207 network stories featured the Democratic frontrunner, a major-
ity of those (105) raised questions about his character. The 
character cloud over Clinton raised the specter of 1988. Even the 
charges-adultery and draft dodging-were an echo of the previ-
ous campaign. But Clinton's primary victories largely succeeded 
in ending the wave of stories about his character. 
Campaign issues declined in frequency during the next 
two phases of the 1992 campaign, but they remained a visible 
presence on the evening news. Clinton's character was revisited 
on occasion, but after the primaries it was raised mainly by 
Republicans, not reporters. Journalists themselves raised ques-
tions about the propriety of the Bush campaign's focus on Clinton's 
character. Journalists also squared off against the Perot campaign, 
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Table2 
ELECTION NEWS TOPICS OVER TIME 
1992 CAMPAIGN 
Gen. 
Primaries Conv's Election TOTAL (N) 
Polley Issues 32% 40% 32% 35% 829 
Campaign Issues 33% 28% 32% 31% 739 
Horse Race 33% 15% 35% 27% 649 
TOTAL STORIES 828 830 728 2,386 
Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/92-6/2/92; Conventions, 6/3/92-9/6/92; General Election,9/7 /92-11/2/92 
Note - Totals do not equal 100% because more than one topic may have been coded per story, and table excludesless frequently 
covered topics such as past campaigns, nature of the electorate, etc. 
raising questions about his character an~ ability to serve_ as ~hief 
Executive. For the year, the networks aired 739 campaign issue 
stories, compared with 752 such stories during 1988. 
Policy issues, on the other hand, were given much greater 
prominence b~ the networks in 19~2. For the year'. the number of 
policy stories mcreased from 610 m 1988 to 829 m 1992, re~re-
senting an increase from 28 percent to 35 percent of all campaign 
news. This represents an inqease of 36 percent in the number of 
policy stories, and a 25 percent increase in the proportion of 
election coverage devoted to policy issues. Economic issues 
dominated the campaign, from New Hampshire through the fall 
presidential debates. The state of the economy was featured in 
220 election reports, or nearly 10 percent of all campaign stories. 
Other economic matters also received heavy coverage, including 
raxes (147 stories),jobs (76 stories), and the deficit (71 stories). 
The general election period saw the least attention paid to 
policy issues and the most given to the horse race, reversing the 
dynamics of coverage in 1988. Even the concentration of debates 
between October 11 and 19 seems to have increased horse race 
coverage at the expense of policy issues. Most stories during 
those eight days focused on who won or lost the debates, and any 
subsequent movement detected in public opinion polls. The 
substance of the debates was usually not repeated in post-debate 
coverage, except in stories detailing factual errors made by the 
candidates. 
At first glance, it is difficult to explain why the amount of 
horse race coverage during the general election increased from 
1988 to 1992. In each case, the frontrunner held a lead of about 
6 to 10 percentage points throughout the fall. Bush took the lead 
in 1988 polls following the Republican convention in August, and 
his lead remained fairly solid during the general election. In 1992, 
Clinton took the lead after his July convention, and it remained 
intact for the rest of the campaign. For the most part, polling 
results showed no more variation in the fall of 1992 than they had 
in the fall of 1988. (Public Opinion, 1~88; Roper Center, 1992) 
The data show a substantial increase in horse race news 
after October 1, apparently the result of Perot's re-entry into the 
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race combined with the unique concentration of debates. For the 
last month of the campaign, the networks aired 196 horse race 
stories (compared to 137 on policy issues). During that time, the 
three major network news organizations generated their own new 
polls at the rate of nearly one per day (Roper Center, 1992), while 
also airing the results of polls conducted by rival networks 
(especially those of CNN). This cross-reporting of polls, which 
was not done in 1988, greatly increased horse race coverage in the 
campaign's final days. 
Despite the attention given to the horse race in the final 
weeks of the campaign, the amount of policy coverage marks a 
shift from past network practices. This increase clearly represents 
a shifting of news priorities from 1988. Could this simply reflect 
changes in candidate behavior or real world events? Certainly, 
much of the issue agenda of the campaign had its basis in events, 
particularly the economic recession. Also, the 1992 race featured 
candidates such as Paul Tsongas, Ross Perot, and Bill Clinton, 
whose campaigns touted issues and policy proposals to a greater 
degree than typical candidates have in recent years (although past 
elections saw their share of issue-oriented candidates, in particu-
lar Reagan in 1980 and Jackson in 1984). These factors added to 
the amount of issue coverage in 1992, and helped shape the 
agenda of policy coverage. 
But some of the increase in policy coverage is clearly due 
to the actions of the news organizations themselves. Not only had 
the networks signalled their intentions during the years between 
the 1988 and 1992 campaigns (Russert, 1990), but they had 
already begun to shift to a feature-oriented format marked by 
diminished attention to the news of the day . During the campaign, 
feature segments such as ABC's "American Agenda," CBS's 
"Eye on America," and NBC's "America Close Up" routinely 
departed from the campaign trail to provide contextual and 
thematic coverage of the issues and candidates. The "American 
Agenda," in particular, provided discussion of policy issues that 
was untainted by talk of campaign strategy or horse race consid-
erations. The increased attention to policy in 1992 seems as much 
the result of intentional changes in approach by the journalists 
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who cover the campaign, as the result of changes in the campaign 
itself. 
1988 vs. 1992: FAIRNESS 
In examining the tone of candidate coverage, we have sought to 
make our results as comparable as possible with data from past 
research. Our methodology is based in large part on the 
groundbreaking studies of Michael Robinson, whose calculation 
of each candidate's good and bad press excluded the implications 
of events, polls, and the remarks of partisan sources, including the 
candidates themselves. Robinson analyzed the remaining source 
and reporter statements to obtain an overall score and categorized 
each story as "positive," "negative," or "neutral," based on the 
ratio of positive to negative opinions expressed. (Robinson and 
Sheehan, 1983; Clancey and Robinson, 1985) 
Our analysis was also based on the opinions expressed by 
any independent observers quoted in the story, or on the stated 
views of reporters themselves. We set aside partisan sources for 
the same reason Robinson did, namely, because voters tend to 
give them less credence (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; cf. Page, 
et. al., 1987). We counted only statements which explicitly 
evaluated a candidate's issue positions.job performance, conduct 
as a candidate, ethics, or personal behavior. (We also noted all 
assessments of the candidate's status in the campaign horse race, 
but analyzed those statements separately from our measure of 
good press.) 
Unlike Robinson, however, we did not sum the opinions 
of all non-partisan sources to provide a story-based analysis of 
good press. Instead, our unit of analysis was the individual 
evaluative statement (or sound bite) of a source or reporter. This 
method of data collection enhanced our ability to describe the 
building-blocks of campaign coverage, while avoiding the ambi-
guity of "neutral" or "balanced" stories that might contain widely 
varying amounts of evaluative material. For example, one story 
might have contained three favorable comments about Michael 
Dukakis from voters, two negative comments from political 
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analysts, and a third negative comment from the correspondent 
herself. Another story might contain only one positive and one 
negative comment about Dukakis from two voters. Unlike a 
story-based analysis that codes both reports as equally "bal-
anced," our system captures the differing amounts of opinion 
expressed, as well as the source, target, and direction of each 
evaluation. 
For each time period we calculated the ratio of positive 
opinions to the total of directional opinions expressed about each 
candidate. Scores could range from entirely negative (0% posi-
tive) to entirely (100%) positive coverage. 
Table 3 demonstrates the variability of good press for the 
candidates in 1988. Despite these individual variations, however, 
there was no strong tilt in favor of one political party over the 
other. Among the Democrats, Jesse Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen and 
Bruce Babbitt fared best, while Gary Hart received the least 
favorable publicity. Republicans Jack Kemp and Robert Dole 
received mainly favorable coverage, while Pat Robertson re-
ceived mostly unfavorable coverage. 
While aggregate valuations of the Democratic field were 
more favorable than those of their Republican counterparts (by 54 
to 43 percent positive), these differences disappeared during the 
general election, when the two parties' candidates are directly 
compared. Indeed, most of the Democratic margin is accounted 
for by coverage of Jesse Jackson. Although Jackson was not 
treated as a viable candidate in 1984 (Broh, 1987), his 1988 
primary showings helped change that perception. The newfound 
strength of his candidacy gave his campaign an historical signifi-
cance as the first "serious" black presidential candidate, which 
endowed his coverage with a uniquely positive cast Excluding 
remarks about Jackson, the Democratic field received 46 percent 
positive coverage, nearly identical to that of the Republicans. 
Coverage of the two presidential nominees, George Bush and 
Michael Dukakis, was virtually identical in tone ( 43% positive 
each). 
In general, the 1988 data lend greater support to a hypoth-
esis of"frontrunner bias" than to one of partisan bias. Democratic 
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Table 3 
EV ALUA TIO NS OF CANDIDATES OVER TIME-1988 
(PERCENT POSITIVE) 
Gen. 
Primaries Conventions Election TOTAL (N) 
BUSH 52% 46% 37% 43% 318 
QUAYLE 
-
41 19 34 83 
DOLE 62 - - 62 37 
ROBERTSON 37 - - 37 57 
KEMP 56 - - 56 9 
DUKAKIS 57 47 32 43 336 
BENTSEN 
-
87 100 92 24 
JACKSON 73 92 - 76 171 
GORE 48 - - 48 21 
GEPHARDT 62 - - 62 39 
SIMON 63 - - 63 8 
BABBITT 80 - - 80 5 
HART 10 
- -
10 21 
ALLREPUBS 50 44 34 43 508 
ALLDEMS ~ .fil ll .H ~ 
ALLCANDS 57% 53% 34% 49% 1,133 
Time Periods: Primaries l/l/88-6n /88; Conventions, 6/8/88-9/4/88; General Election, 9/5/88-11n /88 
Note - No report for candidates with fewer than five evaluations. 
frontrunner Dukakis consistently received more negative cover-
age than Jackson, his nearest rival. Republican frontrunner Bush 
received heavy criticism (72% negative) prior to the Iowa cau-
cuses, where he placed third behind Dole and Robertson. After 
Iowa, however, Bush was no longer considered the frontrunner, 
and he received his first good press of the primary season (79% 
positive). After Bush's New Hampshire victory a week later, his 
coverage became less positive (57% positive for the remainder of 
the primaries). 
But some candidates were given largely unfavorable press 
in spite of their longshot status. News coverage ofDemocrat Gary 
Hart and Republican Pat Robertson was mainly negative. In 
Hart's case, much of the criticism came during the spring of 1987, 
when he was still the putative frontrunner in the still-forming 
Democratic field (Lichter et. al., 1988). But coverage of Hart 
remained distinctly critical after he re-entered the race in late 
1987, despite the fact that his support in the polls was much 
reduced. Only ten percent of evaluations of Hart were favorable 
during the primary season, the lowest of any candidate. 
News coverage of Robertson was also mainly negative, 
even after his New Hampshire loss effectively ended any chance 
of his securing the Republican nomination. The candidate contin-
ued to receive considerable scrutiny of his ministry, his beliefs, 
and questions over the factual accuracy of many of his statements. 
After New Hampshire, only 18 percent of the opinions expressed 
about Robertson on the news were positive. 
The cases of Hart and Robertson refute the notion that the 
press failed in 1988 to accept the responsibility of screening out 
unacceptable candidates, a function once performed by political 
party bosses. Coverage of both men was dominated by questions 
about their personal character and temperamental ability to serve 
as president. Both also received a large volume of news coverage, 
far more than other candidates with similar poll standings. 
But the most striking feature of the 1988 general election 
is the precision with which coverage of the two presidential 
nominees was balanced. Dukakis and Bush received a nearly 
identical number of evaluations (318 to 336, respectively), and 
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virtually identical proportions of unfavorable press (57% nega-
tive). 
This balance, once the sort of statistic journalists would 
cite to prove their political independence, was condemned by 
some critics of the 1988 coverage. Writing in Newsweek shortly 
after the election, Jonathan Alter stated that "By almost any 
standard, Bush slung several tons more mud than Dukak.is, who 
for weeks was criticized for not fighting back. But misguided 
ideas of fairness required that reporters implicate both equally, 
lest they be seen as taking sides .... Fear of seeming slanted 
overcame any interest in reporting a larger truth." (Alter, 1988) 
Others shared this view of a press corps that "bent over backwards 
not to seem at all critical of the Republicans." (Miller, 1988) In 
this view, it would have been more "fair" to subject Bush to 
greater criticism, and thus give Dukak.is more favorable coverage 
in light of Bush's campaign conduct. 
The rejection of mechanistic "balance" in favor of more 
subjective "fairness" permeated many of the reform proposals 
which followed 1988. In particular,journalists were encouraged 
to take issue with campaign statements or advertisements which 
were clearly unfair, incomplete, or misleading in their depiction 
of the facts. Such an approach, it was hoped, would prevent future 
candidates from dominating the agenda with messages consid-
ered beyond the bounds of fairness. Coupled with calls for 
increased attention to policy issues and less discussion of the 
campaign horse race, these changes offered television viewers the 
prospect of a markedly different view of the campaign and the 
candidates in 1992. (Broder, 1990; Russert, 1990; Barone Center, 
1991) 
As Table 4 shows, the two parties received substantially 
different coverage in 1992. Every Democratic candidate received 
more favorable coverage than any Republican. While some 
Democrats, notably Albert Gore, Paul Tsongas and Bob Kerrey, 
did better than others, no Democrat fared as poorly as independent 
Ross Perot (48 percent positive evaluations). Perot, in turn, 
received much more favorable coverage than either George Bush 
or Dan Quayle, who each received roughly three times as many 
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Table 4 
EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATES OVER TIME-1992 
(PERCENT POSITIVE) 
Gen. 
Primaries Conventions Election TOTAL (N) 
BUSH 16% 30% 31% 27% 926 
QUAYLE 22 35 16 28 65 
BUCHANAN 48 - - 48 54 
CLINTON 44 53 52 50 644 
GORE - 95 54 78 32 
BROWN 51 - - 51 89 
TSONGAS 73 - - 73 62 
HARKIN 54 - - 54 13 
KERREY 71 - - 71 21 
PEROT 65 43 45 48 426 
STOCKDALE - - 57 57 16 
ALLREPUBS 22 31 30 28 1,045 
ALLDEMS 52 57 52 53 861 
ALL PEROT 65 43 46 48 442 
ALLCANDS 42% 40% 41% 41% 2,348 
Time Periods: Primaries 1/1/92-6/2/92; Conventions, 6/3/92 -9/6/92; General Election, 9n /92-11/2/92 
Note - No report for candidates with fewer than five evaluations. 
unfavorable as favorable evaluations. The differences between 
the parties existed in the primary, convention, and general elec-
tion phases of the campaign. 
As in 1988, coverage during the primaries was typically 
most negative toward frontrunners. Bush received less favorable 
coverage than his main challenger, Pat Buchanan, while Demo-
crat Bill Clinton received less favorable coverage than his chief 
rivals, Paul Tsongas and Jerry Brown. During the primaries, only 
44 percent of sources expressed favorable opinions about Clinton, 
while his rivals combined for 61 percent favorable evaluations. 
Even Perot's coverage fits the frontrunner hypothesis. 
Perot began to receive coverage as a prospective candidate in late 
March. Through the end of the primaries on June 2, Perot had 
received largely favorable coverage (65% positive). On June 3 
large percentages of primary voters in several states told exit 
pollsters that they would have voted for Perot had he been on the 
ballot. Results indicated Perot might have beaten Bush among 
California Republicans and Clinton among Ohio Democrats. A 
CNN poll taken June 3-4 showed Perot with 37 percent of the 
general election vote, compared with 24 percent each for Clinton 
and Bush. 
Despite the fact that no third candidate had ever won the 
presidency before, the poll results validated perceptions of Perot 
as the frontrunner of a three-way race. For the next six weeks, until 
he withdrew from the race on July 16, the tone of Perot's media 
coverage grew increasingly critical. Reporters began investiga-
tions into his business practices and perceived inconsistencies in 
his stated record. In the final week of his campaign, televised 
comments about Perot were nearly 80 percent negative. 
Thus, the Perot candidacy fit the pattern: a candidate 
develops support while receiving mainly good press, but then 
reaches frontrunner status, receives increased criticism, and loses 
support. This is the same pattern described by content analysts 
reaching back to 1980. Candidates from John Anderson to Gary 
Hart to George Bush (in 1980 and 1988), Bob Dole, Jesse Jackson 
and Paul Tsongas have alternately benefitted and suffered from its 
consistent application over the years. 
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But an interesting development occurred during the 1992 
conventions and general election period. In 1988, the tone of 
Dukakis' and Bush's coverage had converged during the conven-
tion phase, and remained in synch for the rest of the campaign. But 
during the convention phase in 1992, Bush received only 30 
percent positive evaluations, compared with over 50 percent 
positive evaluations for Clinton. During the general election 
phase, the situation was virtually unchanged, with 31 percent 
good press for Bush, compared with 52 percent positive press for 
Clinton. 
While other phases of the 1992 campaign also showed 
wide variations in the favorable coverage of various candidates, 
what makes this discrepancy noteworthy is the relative polling 
positions of Bush and Clinton. Clinton led, and Bush trailed, in 
every poll taken after the Democratic convention, and Clinton's 
lead averaged over 10 percentage points during the fall. (Roper 
Center, 1992) 
It was not only polls which painted Clinton as a likely 
winner. As Table 5 shows, comments by reporters themselves on 
television newscasts also described Bush as badly trailing the 
Democrat. After the primaries ended, fewer than one in four 
reporter statements ever reflected favorably on Bush's status or 
chances in the presidential race. After the Democratic conven-
tion, when Clinton solidified his lead in opinion polls, never less 
than three out of four reporter statements rated favorably Clinton's 
chances or status in the campaign horse race. 
Thus, Clinton remained the frontrunner throughout the 
final four months of the 1992 campaign, both in the statistical 
findings of public opinion polls, and in the perceptions of report-
ers following the race. Yet, as Table 6 shows, the tone of Clinton's 
coverage was more favorable than that of Bush during every phase 
of the campaign (and, following the Democratic Convention, 
more favorable than that of Ross Perot). In no other content 
analysis of a presidential election has a clear frontrunner received, 
over a sustained period of time, more favorable coverage than his 
rivals. 
How could a hypothesis that has proven so accurate in the 
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Table S 
REPORTER ASSESSMENTS OF CANDIDATES STATUS' 
IN HORSE RACE-1992 
(PERCENT POSITIVE) 
Pre-Dem Dem Pre-Rep Rep Pre- Pre- Final 
Conv Conv Conv Conv Perot Debate Debate Days 
(N) 
BUSH 14% 12% 23% 9% 19% 16% 5% 23% 
980 
CLINTON 41 90 90 89 75 82 98 78 
752 
PEROT 70 16 - - 69 16 42 55 
484 
Time Periods: Pre-Democratic Convention, 6/3/92-7 /10/92; Democratic Convention, 7 /11/92-7 /19/92; Pre-Republican Convention, 7 /20/92-8/14/ 
92; Republican Convention, 8/15/92-8/23/92; Pre-Perot, 8/24/92-9/30/92; Pre-Debate, 10/1/92- 10/10/92; Debates, 10/11/92-10/19/92; 
Final Days, 10/20/92-11/2/92 
Table6 
EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATES OVER TIME-1992 
(PERCENT POSITIVE) 
Pre-Dem Dem Pre-Rep Rep Pre- Pre- Final 
Conv Conv Conv Conv Perot Debate Debate Days 
(N) 
BUSH 16% 47% 22% 38% 25% 43% 24% 41% 
694 
CLINTON 34 55 65 62 39 61 83 52 
454 
PEROT 52 21 - - 37 07 67 51 
346 
Time Periods: Pre-Democratic Convention, 6/3/92-7 /10/92; Democratic Convention, 7 /11/92-7 /19/92; Pre-Republican Convention, 7 /20/92-8/ 
14/92; Republican Convention, 8/15/92-8/23/92; Pre-Perot, 8/24/92-9/30/92; Pre-Debate, 10/1/92-10/10/92; Debates, 10/11/92-10/19/92; Final 
Days, 10/20/92-11/2192. 
past fail to predict the tone of candidate coverage in this instance? 
One explanation might be that the anti-frontrunner bias in general 
election contests has actually been a surrogate for partisan bias. 
From 1980 through 1988, the frontrunner in the fall campaign has 
been a conservative Republican; only in 1992 was there a Demo-
cratic frontrunner. But this explanation falls short. In 1980, 
Reagan and Carter each received roughly equal amounts of 
negative coverage (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983); in 1988, Bush 
and Dukakis received equally of unfavorable coverage (Lichter, 
et. al., 1989) If there is a bias against conservative Republicans, 
it should have been evident in both those years as well. 
Alternatively, there might be an anti-incumbency bias at 
work. Thus, incumbent Reagan received far more negative 
coverage than challenger Mondale in 1984. (Clancey and 
Robinson, 1985; Graber, 1987) Once again, though, that fails to 
explain the roughly equal amounts of bad press that Carter the 
incumbent and Reagan the challenger received in 1980. 
Could Bush have been perceived as the frontrunner in 
spite of the polls, perhaps because of the power of his incumbent 
status? As we noted earlier, in the last four months of the 
campaign, reporters themselves spoke negatively about Bush's 
chances of winning by margins of between four-to-one and ten-to-
one. (See Table 5) By the fall, campaign reporters clearly 
perceived Bush to be the underdog in the race, and said as much. 
Perhaps 1992 was an aberration; only the 1996 campaign 
and those beyond will tell us whether this is the case. But we 
believe that another explanation is in order: Television has 
changed the rules of its campaign coverage. In attempting to 
referee the campaign, reporters have unwittingly created an 
environment in which their own values and beliefs take on 
increased importance. Further, in attempting to force the cam-
paign to meet their own perceptions of f aimess, reporters may 
actually have damaged their own credibility and public image. 
SUMMARY /DISCUSSION 
Much of what was new in television's coverage of the 1992 
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campaign came about in reaction to what was perceived as wrong 
with coverage of the 1988 campaign. Television news was 
criticized for being too constrained by campaign trail events, 
covering candidate sound bites, photo-opportunities, and attacks 
to the detriment of both substance and fairness. Our content 
analysis of that campaign casts doubt about this indictment of 
television's campaign role. We found that television's coverage 
of policy issues increased as the 1988 campaign progressed, while 
cov~rage of polls and the campaign "horse race" received dimin-
ished coverage over time. We also found no evidence that 
television coverage favored George Bush over Michael Dukakis. 
Nonetheless, the perception that they had served the 
public poorly proved powerful enough to mobilize the networks 
to reform their coverage. In 1992, the coverage moved away from 
transmitting the events of the day in order to provide more 
discussion of policy, and a more independent and disinterested 
assessment of the candidates. 
The networks certainly achieved their goal of more policy 
coverage (at least until the presidential debates took place). But 
the question off airness is harder to assess. What was perceived 
as "unfair" about 1988 had been the ability of a candidate (in that 
case, George Bush) to control the news agenda with his attacks on 
his opponent. Those attacks were seen by reporters (among 
others) as lacking in the necessary substantiation in reality to be 
considered "fair." In 1992, the goal of the networks was to check 
the ads, check the facts, counter the rhetoric, and discipline 
candidates who roamed too far out of bounds. 
CBS News instituted a new feature called the "Campaign 
'92 Reality Check." All three networks dedicated at least some 
resources to" Ad Watches." Candidate assertions were frequently 
contradicted by reporters. Tactics that reporters perceived as 
unfair were so labelled. Campaign trail reports no longer pre-
sented one campaign's point of view, balanced by the other side's 
corresponding report, but rather the reporter's critique of that 
candidate's day. Often they included a response from the other 
side as well. 
In practice, George Bush was by far the most frequent 
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target of television's new assertiveness. We coded 152 instances 
during the general election in which reporters drew into question 
or refuted campaign statements. More than half of these (52%) 
focused on Bush campaign, compared with only 24 percent each 
for the Clinton and Perot campaigns. Ads were scrutinized in 
1992, but they were mostly Bush's ads. Two-thirds (67%) of the 
assessments focused on Bush's ads, compared with 19 percent 
which targeted Perot's ads and 14 percent for Clinton's. And 
most of the comments about Bush's ads (83%) were negative. 
Of course, it may be that Bush's actions deserved greater 
scrutiny, or more frequent rebuttals, than those of his rivals. If 
these differences were solely the result of reporters' attempts to 
monitor campaign conduct, however, then viewers should have 
been presented relatively balanced coverage of the various candi-
dates' issue positions, personal character, and job performance. 
Yet, while Bush was heavily criticized for his campaign con-
duct-93 percent of sources criticized him on those grounds, 
compared with 85 percent who so criticized Clinton-television's 
coverage does not become more balanced when such comments 
are excluded. Indeed, the gap between the two nominees during 
the general election actually increases (34% positive coverage for 
Bush, compared with 57% positive for Clinton). If reporters had 
never broadcast criticisms of any candidate's campaign conduct, 
there would still have been a major imbalance in the tone of 1992 
election coverage. 
In contrast to 1988, reporters do not appear overly con-
cerned about how the candidates conducted themselves during 
1992. A poll of journalists taken in October, 1992, finds that more 
than half (55%) believed that Bush's candidacy was hurt by the 
way he was covered by the media. When asked why, most cited 
his record as president, or the prominence of the economy as an 
issue in the campaign; neither the tone nor fairness of Bush's 
campaign was cited. (Times Mirror, 1992) As Newsweek noted 
just before the election, "The main reason the president has 
received a bad press is that he's done badly." (Alter, 1992) 
Campaign conduct was not, in 1992, the high-profile issue it was 
in 1988. Bush's bad press was not compensation for an unfair 
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campaign; it was rooted in journalists' perceptions of a job poorly 
done. 
Journalists were encouraged after 1988 to retreat from the 
campaign trail, provide more analysis and perspective, and keep 
the news from becoming hostage to the campaigns' competing 
agendas. In large part, this was accomplished. But the force 
behind such a shift in approach was concern over the conduct of 
the campaign. Reporters gave themselves license to referee the 
contest and make it "fairer." But this gave reporters permission 
to pick sides and settle disputes among the candidates. It was an 
environment where reporters felt freer to use their own judgment 
analyzing and assessing the campaign. 
Despite qualms voiced during the primaries, most journal-
ists now appear satisfied with this new role in the campaign 
process. The Times Mirror survey found that four out of five 
journalists rated the 1992 coverage as "good" or "excellent." The 
survey also reported that many of the top media people inter-
viewed volunteered that the coverage was much improved from 
1988. Two-thirds of reporters rated coverage of policy issues and 
particularly the economy as at least good; more than a quarter 
(27 % ) said that coverage of the economy was "excellent." (Times 
Mirror, 1992) Everette Dennis, director of Columbia University's 
Freedom Forum Center, recently pronounced the coverage "ex-
emplary." (Dennis, 1993) 
By contrast, public dissatisfaction with election coverage 
has receded far less. After 1988, 39 percent of the public believed 
the coverage to be only "fair" or"poor." (Times Mirror, 1988) A 
similar poll in 1992 found 38 percent who gave those ratings. 
Fifty-four percent believed that the press has too much influence 
on which candidate becomes president. Even worse for the press, 
most of the electorate believes that journalists "often" ( 49%) or 
"sometimes" (35%) let their own political preferences influence 
the way they report the news. Asked who they thought most 
reporters wanted to see win the election, more than half (52 % ) said 
Clinton; only one in six (17%) said Bush, and only about a quarter 
(26%) said they didn't know. (Times Mirror, 1992) 
These poll results suggest that journalists may have con-
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--
centrated in changing those aspects of campaign coverage that 
they were most concerned about, rather than what most concerns 
the public. The unexpected popularity of talk shows as an 
"unmediated" form of campaign information points in the same 
direction. All the changes failed to allay-and may have rein-
forced-the electorate's objections to intrusive, negativistic, and 
partisan news coverage. One result is that the public increasingly 
views the press as a partisan player in the electoral process, rather 
than as a fair and honest broker of the candidates' competing 
claims. In journalism as elsewhere, reforms may carry unantici-
pated consequences, and their costs must be weighed against their 
benefits. If journalists sacrifice their own credibility in an effort 
to improve the political process, then journalism, electoral poli-
tics, and governance will all share the costs of their good inten-
tions. 
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